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Rushin: The Regulation of Private Police

THE REGULATION OF PRIVATE POLICE
Stephen Rushin*
ABSTRACT

Private police assume many of the same roles as traditional law
enforcement. But courts and legislatures regulate public and private police very
differently. This Article evaluates the statutory and judicial regulation of
private police. By collecting and coding all state statutes related to the
regulation of private police, I theorize on the inadequacies of the current
regulatory scheme. I show that most state statutes only regulate a certain
category of private police officers, leaving a substantial portion of the private
policing industry virtually unregulated. Many state regulations of private police
misunderstand, and thus inadequately protect against the threat posed by the
private policing industry. I argue that while most state regulations facilitate
predictable transactions for security services, few statutes protect individuals
from the potential social harms of the privatized police. Based on these
descriptive observations, I make several normative recommendations for future
regulation. In doing so, I borrow from the sociological literature on
organizational regulation. I conclude that judicial attempts to control private
police behavior through the expansion of the state action doctrine would be
ineffective at deterring private police misconduct. Instead, state legislatures
should expand the depth and breadth of current statutes.
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INTRODUCTION

Over the last several decades, law and social science scholars have
written extensively on the privatization of traditional state functions.' This socalled "era of privatization" 2 has transformed American governance and
elicited seriofis concerns about accountability and regulation. Perhaps no
traditional government function has evolved more during this era of
privatization than policing. For much of modem American history, public law
enforcement monopolized policing.4 But organizations have increasingly
internalized traditional policing functions by hiring private security personnel.5
Indeed, American policing has become "pluralized" as traditional police have

See generally David A. Sklansky, The PrivatePolice, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1165 (1998).
Laura A. Dickerson, Privatizationand Accountability, 7 ANN. REV. LAW & Soc. SCi. 101,
102 (2011).
3
Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1191 (noting that "[tihe frequency with which this complaint is
raised serves as a reminder that the supposed accountability of private policing has a troubling
side as well").
4
David H. Bayley & Clifford D. Shearing, The Future of Policing, 30 LAW & Soc'Y REv.
585, 586 (1996).
Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, When the "Haves" Hold Court: Speculations on
the OrganizationalInternalizationof Law, 33 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 941, 972 (1999).
2
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been "supplanted by more numerous private providers of security." 6 private
police presently outnumber sworn public police. And these private police
officers engage in many of the same coercive social control tactics such as
searches, seizures, arrests, investigations, interrogations, and surveillance.8 But
the law regulates the private security industry differently than public law
enforcement-private police are generally subject to minimal licensing
requirements and receive little in-service training.9
While various scholars have addressed the historical development,'o
conceptualization," and paradoxesl 2 of private police, very little scholarship
has thoroughly addressed the regulation of this emerging agent of social
control. The literature correctly recognizes that state statutes increasingly
require the licensing of some private police officers or private police
agencies.13 The burgeoning number of state licensing requirements has led
some writers to paint a modestly positive picture of private police regulation.14
In this Article, I use a simple coding scheme to assess the current state of
private police regulation. I collect and analyze statutes regulating private police
in all fifty states. I then code each of these laws based on the statute's definition
of private police officer and the statute's regulatory breadth. This methodology
allows me to recognize aggregate patterns in private police regulation. In doing
so, I uncover fundamental assumptions present in many of these statutes. I
borrow from the sociological literature on organizational regulation in arguing
that the current state of the law inadequately addresses serious regulatory
concerns such as accountability, redress for misconduct, and managerial
oversight.
As I demonstrate, if a private company internally employs a private
police officer, many states exclude these private officers from regulation. State
laws consistently fail to regulate these so-called internalized or proprietary

6

Bayley & Shearing, supra note 4, at 588, 597.

7

Edelman & Suchman, supra note 5, at 958.

Id. at 959-60.
Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1279 (citing WILLIAM C. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., HALLCREST
SYSTEMS, INC., PRIVATE SECURITY TRENDS 1970-2000, 148 (1990); JAMES S. KAKALIK & SORREL
8

9

WILDHORN, PRIVATE POLICE IN THE UNITED STATES: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONs 38
(1971); Brae Canlen, Insecurity Complex, CAL. LAW., June 1998, at 32).
10
See Sklansky, supra note 1.
II See Elizabeth E. Joh, Conceptualizing the PrivatePolice, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 573 (2005).
12
See Elizabeth E. Joh, The ParadoxofPrivate Policing, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49,

50 (2004).
13
See, e.g., Jeff Maahs & Craig Hemmens, Train in Vain: A Statutory Analysis of Security
Guard Training Requirements, 22 INT'L J. OF COMPARATIVE & APPLIED CRIM. JUSTICE 91, 99
(1998).
14
Id. (noting that the increase in state statutes purporting to regulate private security officers
between 1981 and 1998 represents "a positive trend").
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officers. This fact is especially perplexing because empirical evidence suggests
that internalized private police are substantially more likely than other security
personnel to wield substantial discretion and engage in coercive behaviors. I
theorize that this demonstrates a consistent pattern evident across state-level
statutory arrangements: a concern for the facilitation of predictable business
transactions between large organizations and third-party security contractors.
State licensing procedures for private police ensure that businesses purchasing
third-party security services will receive a reasonably consistent product
throughout a state marketplace. This sort of statutory framework ignores the
potentially serious harms posed by private police-particularly internalized
personnel. In order to ameliorate these possible threats, I offer several
normative recommendations. Unlike many scholars who argue for the
expansion of the state action doctrine to private police, I emphasize the need for
legislative arrangements. Because private police are primarily motivated by the
desire to protect private assets, private officers likely care about the prevention
of loss more than the successful prosecution of wrongdoers. As such, any
attempt by the courts to extend the application of the Fourth or Fifth
Amendment to non-state actors like private police through the use of the
exclusionary rule would not effectively deter private police wrongdoing.
Instead, legislatures should create laws that mandate private police
transparency, afford aggrieved parties with an efficient means of redress, and
ensure public accountability.
I have divided this Article into three parts. Part II details the evolution
of private police. In this Part, I discuss the growth and purposes of private
police. In this section, I also provide a brief literature review of past research on
private policing. Part III evaluates the state regulation of private police. Finally,
Part IV theorizes on the several patterns evident from the statutory analysis. In
this final Part, I offer several recommendations for future statutory regulation
of private police.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF PRIVATE POLICE

For much of the twentieth century, the police, public, and government
"viewed private security companies as a dangerous and unauthorized intrusion
by private interests into a government preserve."15 But over the last two
decades, governments have come to accept and even encourage private police
as a necessary tool for crime prevention and the protection of property.1 6 In this
Part, I first examine the expansion of private police as an accepted compliment
to traditional law enforcement. In doing so, I also address the different purpose
and logics driving public and private police-an important consideration in
judging the efficacy of current statutory regulations. Second, I examine how the

'

Bayley & Shearing, supra note 4, at 587.

16

Id.
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law has permitted private police to act as coercive agents of social control,
engaging in many of the same behaviors as traditional police. Common law
permits private police to execute limited arrests, detentions, interrogations and
searches. States have reified these permissive common law doctrines by
passing statutes that permit private police wide discretion to act as law
enforcers and protect private police from civil liability.
A.

The Expansion and ResponsibilitiesofPrivatePolice

In his impressive article entitled The Private Police, David Sklansky
offers a sweeping historical analysis of private police, as well as the most
thorough literature review on the subject to date.17 Sklansky identifies three
possible explanations for the growth of private police: (1) a broader ideological
shift in the United States favoring privatization,' 8 (2) the expansion of "mass
private property,"l 9 and (3) the failure of public police to provide sufficient
security services. 20 Sklansky identifies this third potential reason as the most
dominant explanation for the rise of private police.21 Private police are cheaper
to hire than public police.22 Private police also serve unique roles that public
police cannot possibly fill. Private police focus specifically on the
organizational needs of private companies. While the "client" of the public
police is society generally, the "client" of the private police is a specific
organization. 2 3 This means that private police typically focus on preventing
asset loss as opposed to crime control. Once more, private police often turn to
private justice systems instead of relying on the traditional criminal justice
system.2 4
Private police come in various forms, including but not limited to
private residential patrols, 2 5 private security guards,2 6 and private detectives or

See Sklansky, supra note 1.
Id. at 1221.
19 Id. (quoting Clifford D. Shearing & Philip C. Stenning, Private Security: Implicationsfor
Social Control, 30 Soc. PROBS. 493, 496 (1983)).
20
Id at 1222 (explaining that "for over two centuries privately paid entrepreneurs in both
Britain and America have been filling gaps in the police protection offered by public law enforcement").
17
18

21

Id
Id. at 1223 (citing CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 9, at 156). According to Cunningham et
al., public police earn about 50% more than private officers. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 9,
22

at 156.
23
Joh, supra note 11, at 587.
24

See id. at 587-88.

25

Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1173 (citing Jay Apperson, Scaredsuburbiafinds peace of mind
in private security Neighborhood patrols: Fear of crime has communities turning to private
companiesfor added protection. Such securityfirms could be the wave of thefuture, BALTIMORE

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2012

5

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 115, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 12

164

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 115

27
investigators. Today, Americans encounter private security officers at private
"buildings, factories, warehouses, schools, sports facilities, concert halls, train
stations, airports, shipyards, shopping centers, parks, government facilitiesand, increasingly, residential neighborhoods." 28 Indeed, Sklansky believes that
an average person interacts with private police more frequently than public
police on a day-to-day basis. 29
Surprisingly though, despite the important role of private police in
American society, few scholars have empirically analyzed the private policing
movement. A small amount of recent legal academia addresses private policing.
Sklansky published his comprehensive legal and historical piece on private
policing in 1999, introducing future avenues for research. 3 0 Elizabeth E. Joh
has since attempted to conceptualize the institution of private policing and
introduce some peculiar paradoxes.3 ' Ric Simmons has situated private police
as part of a broader movement toward the establishment of a private criminal
justice system.3 2 Others like M. Rhead Enion and Cooper J. Strickland have
assessed the potential usefulness of regulating private police through the
expansion of the state action doctrine.33 But legal academics on the whole have
failed to thoroughly assess how states regulate private police.
Criminal justice scholars have made several important contributions to
the study of private policing. Clifford Shearing and Philip Stenning have
written on the reasons for the recent growth in private policing.3 4 David Bayley
and Shearing put the private police movement in historical context within the
broader shifts in policing generally.35 And perhaps most notably, William
Cunningham, Todd Taylor, and Hallcrest Systems, Inc. have released two of
the most complete empirical assessments of the private policing industry in

SuN, Apr. 1, 1996, at Al; see also Hillary Durgin, Crime pays: At least, it does for rent-a-cop
firm, CRAIN'S CHICAGO Bus., Nov. 29, 1993, at 4; Larry Hicks, Private Security Patrols Ease
Homeowners' Fears,SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 4, 1994, at Al).

Id. at 1174-75 (stating that "uniformed private officers guard and patrol office buildings"
throughout the country).
27
Id. at 1217-21 (discussing the rise and transformation of private detective agencies).
28
Id. at 1175.
26

29

Id
See id.
31
See Joh, supra note 12. See generallyJoh, supra note 11.
32
See Ric Simmons, PrivateCriminalJustice,42 WAKE FoREST L. REV. 911 (2007).
3
M. Rhead Enion, ConstitutionalLimits On PrivatePolicing and The State's Allocation of
Force, 59 DUKE L.J. 519, 519 (2009); see also Cooper J. Strickland, Regulation Without Agency:
A PracticalResponse to PrivatePolicing in United States v. Day, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1338, 1342
(2010-2011).
34
See Shearing & Stenning, supra note 19, at 496.
3
See Bayley & Shearing, supra note 4, at 587.
30
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19856 and 1990.17 While these accounts advanced the study of private police,
they are increasingly outdated, and also fail to connect the study of private
police back to legal academia.
I hope to fill the gap left in the legal and criminal justice scholarship on
private police by offering a contemporary assessment of the size, regulation,
and legal power of private police. The next section will begin this exploration
by calculating the approximate number of private police officers in the United
States today.
B.

The Size of the American Private Police Force and HistoricalTrends

Private police substantially outnumber sworn public police.38 Only a
few empirical studies over the last several decades have comprehensively
examined the size and scope of private police forces. These studies have used
different definitions of private police and different methodological
measurements.39 Many studies have included in the definition of private police
any individual occupied in a protective service role. This broad, imprecise
definition fails to recognize that certain private security personnel serve more
coercive purposes than others. For the purposes of this study, I distinguish
between private protective personnel and private police officers. The term
private protective personnel refers to any individual privately employed in the
security industry. Locksmiths, alarm-monitoring services, armored car drivers,
private correctional officers, and even lifeguards all fall under the category of
private protective service occupations.4 0 Individuals employed as private
protective personnel are generally responsible for some facet of private
organizational safety, but do not necessarily wield particularly coercive powers
similar to public law enforcement.
This article only purports to study private police officers. By this, I
refer to private protective personnel that take on roles similar to public law
enforcement. The most common examples of private police officers include

WILLIAM CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE HALLCREST REPORT: PRIVATE SECURITY AND POLICE IN
AMERICA (1985).
3
CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 9.
38
Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1174.
39
For example, Professor Sklansky cites to statistics compiled by William Cunningham of
Hallcrest System. These studies define private security or private police as interchangeable with
"guards." Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1174 n.27. Meanwhile, Professors Edelman and Suchman
appear to cite to the number of individuals employed among the individuals engaged in "private
security," a potentially wider definition that includes many more protective personnel. Edelman
& Suchman, supra note 5, at 957 n.21.
40
See Occupational Employment and Wages, May 2011, BUREAU LAB. STAT.,
http://www.bls.gov/oes/2010/may/oes330000.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2012) (the Bureau includes firefighters, alarm monitoring, armored car drivers, lifeguards, and other security-oriented
personnel in its definition of private protective services).
36
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security guards, private investigators and private detectives. As I demonstrate
in Part III.B, the law has facilitated the transformation of private police officers
into coercive agents of social control comparable to public police. The majority
of organizations hire private police officers from third-party contractors. 4 1
Often these third-party contractors exclusively market themselves as sellers of
private security forces. I refer to the employees of these security contractors as
third-party private police. Conversely, a sizeable minority of organizations
employ their own proprietary police force, which I will refer to as internalized
private police.42 These internalized officers are not employed by a third-party
security contractor, but instead hired and employed exclusively by a single
proprietary employer. As I will discuss in Part III and IV, state statutes give
great importance to the distinction between internalized and third-party private
police.
In order to accurately assess the size of the private police force in the
United States, I collected statistics from various sources: the Bureau of Labor
Statistics ("BLS"), 43 the United States Economic Census ("USEC"),44 the
Employment and Training Administration ("ETA"), 45 and previous empirical
studies. Through reference to these different resources, I roughly calculate the
current size of the private police force in the United States, as well as the
number of private police officers employed by third-party security contractors
compared to the number of private police officers employed internally by
proprietary companies. Finally, I examine some intriguing historical trends in
private police employment over the last several decades.

41

KEVIN STROM, ET AL., UNTIED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE PRIVATE SECURITY INDUSTRY:

A REVIEW OF THE DEFINITIONS, AVAILABLE DATA SOURCES, AND PATHS MOVING FORWARD , 4-34-4 (2010), availableat https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/bjs/grants/232781.pdf
42
Id
OccupationalEmployment and Wages, May 2011, supra note 40.
See UNITED STATES ECONOMIC CENSUS BUREAU, INDUSTRY STATISTICS SAMPLER, NAICS
5616: INVESTIGATIONS AND SECURITY SERVICES, available at http://www.census.gov/
43
4

UNITED STATES ECONOMIC CENSUS BUREAU, INDUSTRY
econ/industry/ec07/a5616.htm;
SERVICES,
available at
INVESTIGATIONS
NAICS
561611:
SAMPLER,
STATISTICS
http://www.census.gov/econ/industry/ec07/a561611.htm; see also STROM ET AL., supra note 41,
at 4-4 (roughly verifying my calculations).
45
See Details Report for. 33-9032.00-Security Guards, O*NET
ONLINE,
http://www.onetonline.org/link/details/33-9032.00 (last visited Sept. 19, 2012) (finding there
were approximately 1,036,000 private security guards in the United States); Details Report for:
33-9021.00-Private Detectives, O*NET ONLINE, http://www.onetonline.org/link/summary/339021.00 (last visited Sept. 19, 2012) (finding that there are 35,000 private detectives and investigators). I calculated the number of private police by adding together the number of security
guards, private detectives, and private investigators.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol115/iss1/12

8

Rushin: The Regulation of Private Police

THE REGULATION OF PRIVATE POLICE

2012]

1.

167

Size of Private Police Force

Various empirical measures suggest that private police outnumber
public police forces. The BLS, USEC, and ETA private police employment
estimates are remarkably similar. The USEC estimate is the most conservative,
estimating that there are approximately 830,702 private police officers in the
United States.4 6 The BLS and ETA place the number at 1,035,09047 and
1,071,00048 respectively. By averaging the three estimates, we can say with
reasonable confidence that the private police force in the United States nears
1,000,000 officers.
Only the BLS breaks down this private police force between
internalized and third-party forces-according to the BLS, approximately 61%
of private police forces work for a third-party contract security company, while
the remaining 39% are employed internally within a proprietary company.4 9
This roughly comports with previous empirical research. Two separate studies
from 1982 and 2010 confirmed that around 60% of private police forces
worked for a third-party contractor-with the rest presumably working
internally.50 Based on these three studies, we can safely conclude that thirdparty security contractors, indeed, employ around 60% of private police, or
nearly 600,000 officers, with the proprietary employers internally employing
the remaining 40%, or almost 400,000 officers.
Private police in the United States dwarf the number of sworn public
law enforcement officers-the Federal Bureau of Investigations ("FBI")
Uniform Crime Reports ("UCR") reports that state and federal law enforcement
agencies employed 705,009 sworn officers, and 308,599 civilian personnel in
2010.51 Figure 1 compares the size of the private and public police forces. 5 2 I

46

UNITED STATES ECONOMIC CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 44.

47
OccupationalEmployment and Wages, May 2011, supra note 40. Again, I calculated the
number of private police by adding together the number of security guards, private detectives,
and private investigators.
48
Details Reportfor: 33-9032.00-Security Guards,supra note 45.
49

OccupationalEmployment and Wages, May 2011, supra note 40.

50

WILLIAM C. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE: NATIONAL

INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, CRIME AND PROTECTION IN AMERICA: A STUDY OF PRIVATE SECURITY AND

LAW ENFORCEMENT RESOURCES AND RELATIONSHIPS 15 (Daniel Ford, 1985); see STROM ET AL.,

supra note 41, at 4-4.
51

FBI Releases 2010

Crime Statistics, FEDERAL BUREAU

OF INVESTIGATIONS

2,

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/20 10/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/2010%
20CIUS%20Summary.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2012) [hereinafter FBI UCR].
52

The data for this figure comes from two sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics occupational

estimates and FBI UCR police employee surveys. The number of individuals employed in the
private security industry is conservatively estimated based on Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates, and projections from a study commissioned by the Department of Homeland Security on
the number of security guards.
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average the BLS, USEC and ETA calculations to estimate the size of the
private police force. I used previous calculations to estimate the rough
breakdown of internalized and third party officers.
Figure1: EstimatedSize ofPrivate andPublic PoliceForces, United States53

Intem-alized

Privts Police

Public Police

Indeed, the American private police force today appears to be a large
and formidable agent of social control, likely surpassing the number of sworn
public police officers and comparing favorably to the total number of public
police personnel.
2.

Trends in Private Police Employment

Over the last several decades, two important trends emerge in private
policing. First, while the number of private police has increased substantially
between 1980 and 2000, private police forces have remained relatively stable
over the last decade. Between 1980 and 2000 the number of private police
exploded by nearly 80%.54 But since 2000, the number of private police has
remained relatively stable at around 1,000,000 private officers. The stagnation
in private police size may simply be a reflection of economic contraction in
private industry. Conversely, the stabilization may be a result of the national
decline in crime that has occurred over the last twenty years. Regardless of why
private police forces have stabilized, we can safely conclude that private police
forces are no longer rapidly expanding in size.
Second, and more interestingly, the ratio of internalized to third-party
private police has changed significantly over the decades. Earlier empirical
work suggests that internalized officers previously outnumbered third-party

53

Occupational Employment and Wages, May 2011, supra note 40; UNITED STATES

EcoNoMIc CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 44; Details Reportfor: 33-9032.00-Security Guards,su-

pra note 45; FBI UCR, supra note 51.
54
STROMET AL., supra note 41, at 4-4.
55
Id
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officers by a ratio of 6:1 in 1960.56 By 1970, this ratio fell to 3.5:1.57 And by
1975, internalized forces only outpaced third-party officers by 1.5:1.58 In 1982,
third-party officers finally surpassed internalized police by a margin of about
1.5:1, and this ratio has remained relatively stable ever since.59 Some previous
literature has hypothesized that organizations are increasingly internalizing
legal enforcement through the use of private security.60 Broadly speaking, this
hypothesis is accurate, as the total size of the private police force in the United
States has expanded by about 80% since 1980.61 Organizations previously
internalized legal enforcement through the hiring of private police officers as
internally employed private police; today, organizations have shifted towards
third-party private police contractors. This data supports theories of broad
organizational externalization durinF the late twentieth century, rather than
previously predicted internalization.6
In sum, the size of the private police force in the United States appears
both large and stable. But how do private and public police differ? In the next
section, I borrow from the sociology of organizations literature on institutional
logics in arguing that social institutions frame the way that public and private
police interact with the public. Any effective regulation ought to take into
account these implicit differences in public and private police behavior.
The InstitutionalLogic Implicit in the PrivatizationofForce

C.

Following the view of the famous sociologist Max Weber, many
scholars traditionally view the state as the holder of a rightful monopoly of
force.63 Consequently, these scholars viewed policing as an inherently statecentric enterprise. The state defined "what sort of security was needed and

56
Clifford D. Shearing & Philip C. Stenning, Private Security: Implicationsfor Social Control, 30 Soc. PROBS. 493, 495 (1983) (citing JAMEs S. KAKAUK & SORREL WILDHORN, PRIVATE

POLICING INTHE UNITED STATEs 43 (1977)).

5

Id.

58

Id. (citing PREDICASTS, INC., PRIVATE SECURITY SYSTEMs, 26 (1976)).

5

See infra Part II.B.1.
See Edelman & Suchman, supra note 5, at 958.
61
Edelman & Suchman predicted that large organizations were increasingly hiring private
police in an effort to "internalize" elements of the criminal justice system. See id. By showing
that the overall size of the private police force has indeed grown over the last three decades, I
believe this demonstrates some support for this internalization hypothesis. See STROM ET AL.,
supra note 41, at 4-4.
62
See generally GLENN CARROLL & MICHAEL HANNAN, THE DEMOGRAPHY OF CORPORATIONS
AND INDUSTRIES (2000); see also W. Richard Scott, Reflection on a Half-Century of Organizational Theory, 30 ANN. REV. SOCIOLOGY 1, 11 (2004).
63
See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETATIVE SOCIOLOGY
60

(1968).
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provided the means to achieve it." 64 Over the last several decades, though,
privatization has radically restructured American policing. 65 The government
no longer monopolizes the legitimate exercise of security and policing. Instead
the state shares these social control duties with a bevy of separate, yet
functionally similar groups like neighborhood street patrols, community watch
groups, and private policing organizations.66 Private police, in particular,
engage in many of the same socially coercive behaviors as public law
enforcement. Indeed, public and private police both practice a form of
policing-loosely defined as the preservation of order, protection of property,
and safeguarding of individuals. 67 But the purposes and logics underlying
public and private policing differ remarkably.
In order to explore the different purposes and motivations underlying
public and private police, I borrow from the sociology of organizations
literature on institutional logics. 6 8 Institutional logic theory states that in order
to understand organizational or individual behavior, scholars must understand
the institutional context that regularizes and legitimatizes behavioral trends. If
private and public police operate under different institutional logics, we may
expect that organizational actors within the two fields interact differently with
the public. Understanding these differences in institutional logics is vital to
making effective regulatory recommendations. As I conclude, the institution of
capitalism primarily shapes the behavior of organizations and actors in the field
of private policing. The institution of capitalism emphasizes logics like profit
maximization, wealth accumulation, and client service. Conversely, public
policing organizations have become institutionalized organizations. 69 The
institution of public policing stresses logics like justice, community ordering,
safety, transparency, and accountability. The institution of public policing is
also tightly linked with the institution of democracy.70 I hypothesize that public

6

DAVID

H.

BAYLEY & CLIFFORD D. SHEARING, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE RESEARCH

REPORT, THE NEW STRUCTURE OF POLICING 5 (July 2001).

See, e.g., Edelman & Suchman, supra note 5, at 958.
66
Bayley & Shearing, supra note 64, at 14.
67
I define policing similarly to Clifford Shearing. See Clifford D. Shearing, The Relation Between Publicand PrivatePolicing, 15 MODERN POLICING 399 (1992).
68
See PATRICIA H. THORNTON & WILLIAM OCASIO, THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF
LOGICS
(2008),
available at
INSTITUTIONALISM:
INSTITUTIONAL
ORGANIZATIONAL
http://patriciathomton.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/9781412931236-Ch03.pdf (providing a
brief explanation of the literature on institutional logics).
69
See John P. Crank, Watchman and Community: Myth and Institutionalizationin Policing,
28 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 325, 326 (1994); see also John P. Crank, InstitutionalTheory ofPolice: A
Review of the State of the Art, 26 POLICING 186, 204 (2003).
70
See David A. Sklansky, PrivatePolice and Democracy, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 89, 90-91
(2006) (stating that, although public police have been somewhat insulated from the influence of
democracy, "[i]f we want police departments that are less insulated from politics, we can get
them. We had them, after all, before the 1950s").
65
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and private police engage in different behaviors, at least in part, because these
contradictory institutional logics shape the behavior of actors in the respective
organizational fields.
1.

Sociology of Organizations, Institutions, and Institutional
Logics

I begin this section with a brief summary of the organizational theory
on institutional logics. The term institution appears frequently in the
organizational literature and describes macro-level social structures of meaning
and organization. 72 Examples of institutions include marriage, religion,
capitalism, law, police, business, and family. These culturally constructed
mechanisms of social ordering often facilitate cooperation and establish
guidelines for individual and organizational behavior. 73 The literature on
institutional logics emerged out of the new institutionalism subsection of
organizational theory. Early theorists conceived of organizations as rational,
bureaucratic systems that created structures and procedures to maximize
efficiency. 7 4 During the mid-to-late twentieth century, scholars began to
deemphasize rationality and began to stress the influence of cultural institutions
on organizational structures and behavior.75 Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell,
for instance, demonstrated that mindless imitation, influenced by cultural
rationalization, led to organizations developing incredibly similar structures
across organizational fields in a phenomenon called isomorphism. 76 This new
strand of organizational theory, also called the "new institutionalism," differed
from previous scholarship on organizations by rejecting rationality as the
primary predictor of organizational structure, and focused instead on cultural
legitimacy. In 1985, Roger Friedland and Robert Alford introduced the
concept of institutional logics to describe "the contradictory practices and
Other writers have hinted at this concept. See, e.g., id. at 90-91 (stating that "whatever
their day-to-day practices, public law enforcement agencies at least understand their charge as
protecting everyone within their jurisdiction"). No writers, though, have fully articulated the differences in institutional logics between public and private police and how this difference can influence organizational behavior.
72
See Robert C. Atchley, Retirement as a Social Institution, 8 ANNUAL REV. Soc. 263, 264
(1982).
7
See id.
74
See generally Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. Soc. REV. 147
(1983).
7
Thornton & Ocasio, supra note 68, at 100.
76
See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 74, at 149.
n7
Thornton & Ocasio, supra note 68, at 100 (citing Pamela S. Tolbert & Lynne G. Zucker,
Institutional Sources of Change in the FormalStructure of Organizations:The Diffusion of Civil
Service Reform, 1880-1935, 28 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 22 (1983)).
71
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beliefs inherent in the institutions of modem western societies."78 By this,
Friedland and Alford meant that institutions like capitalism, state bureaucracy,
religion, and political democracy influence individuals to act in different and
sometimes contradictory ways. 79 Friedland and Alford expanded this notion of
institutional logics further in 1991 when they wrote that each social institution
has a unique and central logic that guides "organizing principles and provides
social actors with vocabularies" and "identity."80 While various scholars have
attempted to clarify and redefine the notion of institutional logics, "all
presuppose a core meta-theory: to understand individual and organizational
behavior, it must be located in a social and institutional context, and this
institutional context both regularizes behavior and provides opportunity for
agency and change." 8 These institutional logics "focus attention on issues and
solutions through a variety of mechanisms, including determining their
appropriateness and legitimacy, rewarding certain forms of ... behavior ...
shaping the availability of alternatives, and selectively focusing attention on
environmental and organizational determinants of change."82 Thus, for the
purposes of this Article, I use the theoretical notion of institutional logics to
better understand how social institutions may broadly affect the individual and
organizational behavior of public and private police. "Logics provide the rules
of the game that shape the cognition" of private and public police.83
In the two subsections that follow, I investigate the various socially
constructed institutions that influence the behavior of public and private police
organizations. I then assess the central logics of these social institutions to
understand and predict patterns of organizational behavior. Indeed, we should
reasonably expect that public and private police interact with the public
differently, at least in part because of how conflicting social institutional logics
frame their decision-making.
2.

The Institutions of Public Police, Democracy, and the State

Three separate social institutions greatly affect public police: the
institution of public policing, democracy, and the state. While the institution of

78
7
80

Id. at 100-01.
Id. at 101.
Id. (citing Roger Friedland & Robert R. Alford, Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Prac-

tices, and Institutional Contradictions, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL
ANALYSIS

232 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds.,199 1)).

81

Id. at 101.

82

Id. at 144.

Patricia H. Thornton & William Ocasio, InstitutionalLogics and the HistoricalContingency of Power in Organizations:Executive Succession in the Higher Education Publishing Industry, 1958-1990, 105 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 801, 806 (1999) (quoting WALTER W. POWELL & PAUL J.
83

DIMAGGIO, THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (1991)).
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public policing predictably emphasizes central logics of justice, community
ordering, and safety, the public policing institution also stresses logics of public
accountability and transparency. These latter logics are also consistent with the
socially constructed view of public police as agents of governmental
institutions like democracy and the state. As a result, regulators may expect that
police behavior will often reflect adherence to these institutional logics.
Over the last several decades, public police departments have evolved
into institutionalized organizations. The phrase "institutionalized organization"
refers to an organization that has become so common and established within
*
society as to convey a central meaning or convention. 84- By saying public police
departments have become institutionalized, I mean to say that the phrase
"public police department" represents not just a description of an organizational
arrangement, but a complex and socially constructed set of values,
expectations, and customs. Institutionalized organizations differ from
traditional organizations in the sense that traditional organizations turn inward
and focus on profit maximization and efficient production while
institutionalized organizations must focus outwardly to acknowledge influential
constituencies within a broader society.85 A private corporation is a traditional
organization dedicated to profit maximization and efficiency. Public police
departments, by contrast, "must display, in their organizational behavior and
design, that they care about constituents' concerns across this panoply of
groups and the way in which these issues are important to them."8 The implicit
focus on pleasing community and social constituencies, common amongst
institutionalized organizations, suggests a close link to other institutions like
democracy and logics like accountability. According to John Crank, public
policing organizations, as institutionalized organizations, share three common
characteristics. 8 7
First, police respond to the need for community accountability by
creating elaborate procedures. 8 For instance, departments normally have
"elaborate hiring policies," 89 reprimand procedures for misconduct, and explicit
standards regarding community interaction. 90 Second, to maintain the
appearance of accountability while also efficiently achieving imprecise goals of
See Crank, supra note 69, at 187 (citing John Meyer and Brian Rowan, Institutionalized
Organizations:Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AMER. J. OF. Soc. 340 (1977)).
8s
Id. at 186 (citing John Meyer and Brian Rowan, InstitutionalizedOrganizations:Formal
Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AMER. J. OF. Soc. 340 (1977)).
84

at 187.

86

Id

87

Id at 187-88.

88

Id.

89

Id
See

9

generally

ACCOUNTABILITY:

SAMUEL

CURRENT

WALKER,
ISSUES

AND

NATIONAL
RESEARCH

INSTITUTE
NEEDS

OF

JUSTICE,

(2006),

POLICE

available

at

https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/218583.pdf.
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community ordering, public police loosely couple formal procedures with
actual behavior.9 1 Although official departmental policy may mandate specific
arrest policies to maximize the logic of safety, public police organizations also
allocate significant leeway to front-line bureaucrats 92 like patrol officers that
make highly discretionary decisions. Third, "a logic of good faith" pervades
institutionalized organizations like public police. 93 As Crank concluded,
"[o]rganizational members believe in the essential rightness of what they do"
and in the context of public police organizations, "this belief can be an
obstacle . . . to critically evaluat[ing] ongoing organizational practices" since

many supervisors "uncritically accept" the belief that "corruption is the result
of a few bad police officers who slipped through [the] background screening"
rather than endemic of a wider organizational problem.94
Various scholars have reiterated Crank's belief that public police have
evolved into a formidable and articulable social institution, influenced by
various logics such as justice, 95 retribution,9 6 community service,
impartiality, 9 8 and public ordering. 99 The institution of the state and the
institution of democracy similarly influence public police departments-the
central logic of the state is the "rationalization and regulation of human activity
by legal and bureaucratic hierarchies" while the central logic of democracy is
"participation and the extension of popular control over human activity."100 As
agents of a democratic state, the public predictably associates public police
with these institutions and demands a certain level of transparency, formal
hierarchy, accountability, and public participation.
3.

Private Police and the Institution of Capitalism

While public police are understood as state actors, private police are
differently situated and differently conceived within society. The institution of
capitalism primarily influences and motivates private police. Logics like profit

91

Crank, supra note 69, at 188.

92

See generally MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY:

9

Crank, supra note 69, at 188.
Id

DILEMMAS OF PUBLIC
SERVICE (2d ed. 1980); MICHAEL MUSHENO & STEVEN MAYNARD-MOODY, Cops, TEACHERS,
COUNSELORS: STORIES FROM THE FRONT LINES OF PUBLIC SERVICE 10-11 (2003).

94
9
96

Bayley & Shearing, supra note 4, at 592.
Id. (stating that a purpose of public police is that of catching and punishing criminals).

See Crank, supra note 69, at 189.
Id. at 193 (citing Robin Engel, Jennifer M. Calnon & Thomas J. Bernard, Theory and Racial Profiling: Shortcomings and FutureDirectionsin Research, 19 JusT. Q. 249 (2002)).
99
Id. at 189.
Friedland & Alford, supra note 80, at 248.
'0
97

98
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maximization, wealth accumulation, and client service drive the institution of
capitalism. As agents of private organizations, we should expect private police
behavior to embody these implicitly capitalistic logics.
Private police emerged primarily from the needs of large corporations
and organizations for the protection of physical property, intellectual property,
and sensitive corporate information.'0 1 While undoubtedly private police are
hired to ensure some type of "crime prevention and detection,"l 02 the scope of
their employment only requires the protection of a single client's property. The
role of private policing in organizations has expanded to include the reduction
of waste, accidents, errors, and unethical practices. 103 And in recent years, the
largest association of private security personnel in the United States, the
American Society for Industrial Security, has expanded the definition ofprivate
security to include any safeguarding of organizational assets through
investigations, information, risk assessment, and disaster planning.104 While
both for-profit and non-profit organizations employ private police, 05 the
narrow role of the private police officer remains the protection of private
interests in order to maximize profit, enhance efficiency, or facilitate a secure
private business environment. All of this reflects a deep commitment to the
institution of capitalism.
According to Friedland and Alford, the driving logic of capitalism is
the accumulation and commodification of human activity. 06 We could
similarly add to this list the logics of profit maximization and client service.
Because private police are not conceptualized as official agents of the
governmental institutions, like democracy or the state, we may hypothesize that
logics of community accountability and transparency are less salient within the
industrial field.
Other scholars have recognized similar discrepancies between the
logics of public and private police. As Bayley and Shearing have theorized,
"the major purpose of private security is the [reduction of] the risk of crime by
taking preventative actions; the major purpose of the public police is to deter
crime by catching and punishing criminals." 0 7 The duo has also claimed that
private police "emphasize the logic of [private property] security, while public

101 STROM ET AL.,
102
103

supra note 41, at 2-1.
Id. at 2-2 (citing KAKALIK & WILDHORN, supra note 9).
Id. (citing NORMAN K. BOTTOM & JOHN KOSTANOSKI, SECURITY AND Loss CONTROL

(1983)).
10

Id. at 2-3 (citing AM. Soc'Y FOR INDUS. SEC., INTERNATIONAL GLOSSARY OF SECURITY

TERMS 30 (2010), availableat http://www.asisonline.org/library/glossary/p.pdf).
1s Id. at 2-2 (citing GION GREEN, INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY (3d ed. 1981)).
06

107

Friedland & Alford, supra note 80, at 248.
Bayley & Shearing, supra note 4, at 592.
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police "emphasize the logic of justice." 08 Therefore, we should reasonably
expect that public and private police interact with the public differently. While
the logics of public service, accountability, and impartiality will, at least in part,
influence the actions of public police, private police forces will likely feel no
comparable institutional pressure. This presents a cogent theoretical argument
that private police may necessitate more thorough regulation to prevent
misconduct than public police.
PrivatePolice as Coercive Agents of Social Control

D.

Despite the difference in underlying logic and purpose, private police
share two commonalities with public police. To begin with, private police
attempt to maintain legitimacy by mirroring public police in their appearance.
Empirical evidence demonstrates that private police frequently wear uniforms,
badges, and insignia that resemble public police in an effort to appear
legitimate. o9 In addition, private police regularly engage in many of the same
coercive policing tactics as public police: arrest, search, surveillance and
interrogation. As Joh has observed, "Many . .. privately paid police behave like
public law enforcement officers: detaining individuals, conducting searches,
investigating crimes, and maintaining order." 10 Even so, the courts have been
especially reluctant to regulate private policing under the questionable belief
that public police have uniquely coercive abilities and tendencies that merit
oversight. The law has facilitated the transformation of the private police into a
coercive agent of social control. State statutes have transformed over the last
twenty-five years to formally recognize and protect a private police officer's
ability to engage in coercive behavior. The courts have permitted private police
to exercise significant discretion in the exercise of these powers. And neither
the courts nor state legislatures have acted to regulate misconduct by private
police.
1.

Power of Arrest

State statutes have evolved over the last twenty-five years to codify and
expand the arrest power of private police. The limited empirical evidence
available on private police suggests it is not uncommon for private police to
arrest suspected criminals. Internalized private police, though, arrest
significantly more criminal suspects than third-party private police. Ultimately,
the statutory right to detain and arrest suspected criminal offenders affords
private police with a particularly coercive tool of social control comparable to
public police.
108

id

109

CUNNINGHAM ET AL.,

supra note 50, at 25.

110 Joh, supra note 12, at 50.
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Generally speaking, "unless deputized, commissioned, or provided by
ordinance or state statute, private security personnel possess no greater legal
powers than any private citizen."'" Yet few realize that even without statutory
authorization, the common law permits private citizens to arrest suspected
felons,1 2 and permits private citizens to arrest persons for any misdemeanor
involving a breach of the peace committed in the private citizen's presence.113
Over the last twenty-five years, states have increasingly moved to codify the
common law citizen's arrest doctrine.1 4 In 1976, thirty-two states had codified
some common law right to citizen's arrest."s By 2011, all fifty states had
codified at least some right to citizen's arrest.' 16 These statutes vary to some
degree from state-to-state. Some statutes only grant private individuals the right
to arrest another person if she has "probable cause to believe the arrested
person committed the crime."' 17 Other statutes more loosely permit a private
citizen to arrest in situations where she has merely "reasonable grounds to
believe that an offense other than an ordinance violation is being
committed."" 8 As Fred Inbau and others have concluded, phrases like
"reasonable grounds" broadly suggest that private police can arrest suspected
criminals so long as disinterested, impartial observer would view the arrest as
reasonable.1 9 After executing a citizen's arrest, a private police officer must

I CHARLES P. NEMETH, PRIVATE SECURITY AND THE LAW 73 (2005) (quoting THOMAS A.
CRITCHLEY, A HISTORY OF POLICE IN ENGLAND AND WALES 3 (1966)).
112
United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 634 (2d Cir. 1950) (stating that, "[a]t common law
a private person . .. had the power to arrest without warrant for a felony .. . actually committed
in the past, if he had reasonable ground to suppose it had been committed by the person whom he
arrested").
H3 PERKINS & BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 897 (5th ed.
1977).
114 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 837 (1872); CAL. PENAL CODE § 847 (2004); TEX. CODE
ANN. § 14.01 (1967); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-13-10 (1962); N.Y. STATS. ANN. §§ 140.30 (1970),
140.35 (1980), 14.40 (1987).
PRIVATE SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SCOPE OF
"'
PRIVATE SECURITY PERSONNEL app. C2 (1976).
116
FRED E. INBAU, BERNARD J. FARBER & DAVID W. ARNOLD, PROTECTIVE SECURITY LAW
244-324 (1996). I define codification of a citizen's right to arrest broadly as any state statute that
permits a private citizen to detain another private citizen in an arrest-like manner for law enforcement purposes and on the basis of suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. In 1976, one of the
thirty-two state statutes codifying the citizen's arrest doctrine only applied to merchant's and
merchant's employees (like security guards). In 2011, nine of the fifty state statutes codifying the
doctrine only mentioned the merchant context.
117
OR. REV. STAT. § 133.220(3) (1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 133.225 (1973).
118
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/107-3 (West 1964).
119

INBAU, FARBER & ARNOLD, supra note 116, at 24.
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deliver the arrestee to the police for judicial processing.1 20 Some state statutes,
though, permit the private police officer to deliver the suspected offender
directly to the nearest judge or magistrate.121 And private police are allowed to
use reasonable force in executing a citizen's arrest-often defined as the level
of force the private citizen believes is reasonably necessary to prevent death or
bodily harm to herself or another, and commensurate with the threat.12 2
On the whole, the proliferation of state statutes codifying the citizen's
arrest doctrine represent a growing legislative recognition of the increasing
importance of private police as agents of social coercion. The ability to arrest
"is a special competence and preferred tool of the public police." 2 3 Previous
conceptions of private police often disregard the expansive common law and
statutory tradition of citizen's arrest, noting that private police have "no greater
enforcement powers than property owners and ordinary citizens."' 2 4
Technically this is correct-state statutes permit any private citizen to carry out
a citizen's arrest. But while the average citizen has never carried out a citizen's
arrest, empirical evidence demonstrates that private police exercise this
statutory right more frequently.125 Interestingly, though, internalized security
personnel are significantly more likely to exercise their right to arrest than
third-party security. Survey data indicates that about 56% of internalized
security officers have exercised force to arrest a suspected criminal, compared
to only four percent of third-party security officers.12 6 This incongruity makes
sense-interview data indicates that third-party security guards devote little
time to crime prevention, while internalized security spend considerable
resources investigating criminal wrongdoing, interviewing suspects, and
collecting evidence.12 7 This may also explain why internalized security guards
are considerably more likely to carry a firearm. 12 8 In sum, private police,
particularly internalized officers, arrest criminal suspects with some frequency.
And over the last twenty-five years, state legislatures have moved to recognize
and codify the legitimacy of this practice.

120

See, e.g.,

121

725 ILL. COMP. STAT.

ALA. CODE. § 15-10-7 (1940); CAL. PEN. CODE § 847 (2004); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§§ 19-604-14 (1919); MICH. STATS. ANN. § 28.873; N.Y. CRM. PROC. §140.40 (McKinney
1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 202-05 (West 1910); OREG. REV. STAT. § 133.225 (1973);
TENN. CODE. ANN. § 40-7-113 (West 2005).
122

123

§ 5/109-1 (West 2012).
See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/7-6(a) (West 2012).
Bayley & Shearing, supra note 4, at 592.

124

Id.

125

STROM ET AL., supra note 41, at 5-9 fig.23 (citing CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 36).

126

id
CUNNINGHAM & TAYLOR, supra note 50, at 34.
Id. at 34-35.

127
128
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Powers of Search and Seizure

Like traditional law enforcement, private police carry out various types
of searches in an effort to protect property and prevent criminal activity. Private
police exercise this search power both proactively and reactively. Proactively,
private police can execute preemptive stop-and-frisks of suspicious
individuals. 129 This privilege to execute stop-and-frisk searches is reasonably
comparable to the Terry stop procedure utilized by public law enforcement. In
Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court permitted a public law enforcement officer to
carry out a limited stop-and-frisk, or Terry stop, of a suspected criminal based
on reasonable suspicion that the suspect was about to commit a crime.130
Reasonable suspicion is a lower evidentiary standard than probable cause and
merely requires law enforcement to demonstrate a particularized suspicion of
criminal wrongdoing based on "specific and articulable facts" combined with
"rational inferences." 1 3 1 Terry stops, unlike arrests, are limited in time and
scope and only permit law enforcement officers to detain an individual for a
short period of questioning and a minimally invasive search. 132 The law in
many states permits private police to complete limited, investigative stops of
individuals on private property, which are similar to Terry stops.13 3 Private
police may stop individuals on private property to make reasonable inquiries.
And the officer may even conduct "a carefully limited search" of the suspect
for weapons.13 4 Private police can also proactively require as a condition of
employment that employees consent to routine searches of their person or
property. While an employee does not necessarily forfeit her right to privacy,
"even while on the employer's premises," employers frequently require
employees grant the employer a reasonable search privilege. 3 1
While private police lack the ability to search a person's home or
personal property subject to an arrest warrant, private police forces can, and do,
conduct reactive searches with some frequency. For example, private police
may reactively search an individual incident to arrest for stolen contraband and
weapons.136 This happens most frequently when a private police officer arrests
an employee or customer on suspicion of theft. Empirical evidence further

129
130

131
132

& ARNOLD, supra note 116, at 48.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
Id at 21.
Id. at 26, 30.
See INBAU, FARBER

supra note 116, at 48.

133

INBAU, FARBER & ARNOLD,

134

id
Id. at 45.
See id. at 44-45 (citing United States v. Viale, 312 F.2d 595 (2d Cir. 1963); People v. San-

135
131

tiago, 278 N.Y.S.2d 260 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967); Patrick v. State, 301 S.W.2d 138 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1957)).
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shows that internalized security guards conduct searches more frequently than
third-party officers; 37% of internalized officers and 6% of third-party officers
report carrying out lawful searches.' 37 It is also worth reemphasizing that
private police use searches for a different purpose than public police. While
private police stop and search individuals to advance corporate goals, public
police do so in furtherance of values like community ordering and justice.
3.

Powers of Investigation and Interrogation

Private police, particularly internalized forces, interrogate criminal
suspects in a manner similar to traditional law enforcement. Indeed, previous
national surveys have found that "[p]rivate security personnel frequently
conduct investigations of internal and external theft problems, employee
misconduct, embezzlement, and fraud."' 38 When serving in investigative
capacities, private police commonly question suspects, interview witnesses, and
prepare reports for litigation. 3 9 Further, the law facilitates private police
interrogations. While traditional police must read criminal suspects Miranda
warnings before beginning interrogation,140 private police have no comparable
regulation. Thus, private police wield a formidable power to interrogate and
obtain incriminating statements from criminal suspects.
Private police commonly interrogate individuals in two contexts. First,
private police detain and interrogate suspected criminals, particularly those
suspected of shoplifting or theft. Most courts have held that a merchant may
detain and question on her premises a suspected shoplifter.141 Practically, courts
have interpreted this so-called shopkeepers privilege to mean that a private
police officer may detain a suspected thief for a reasonable amount of time,
provided the detention is "solely for reasonably investigative purposes and is
carried out only on the premises of the detaining party."l 4 2 All but one state has
further codified this right of limited detainment by private police.1 43 Like in the
context of arrest, these state statutes permit a private police officer to detain a
suspected criminal based on "reasonable grounds" or "probable cause."l44 But
citizen's arrest statutes simply permit private police to arrest a suspected
criminal and mandate that the private police immediately transfer the suspect to

STROM ET AL., supra note 41, at 5-9 fig.23 (citing CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 36).
PRIVATE SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SCOPE OF LEGAL
AUTHORITY OF PRIVATE SECURITY PERSONNEL 17 (1976).
137
138

1'

CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supranote 50, at 34.

Miranda v. Arizona, 340 U.S. 436 (1966).
INBAU, FARBER & ARNOLD, supra note 116, at 57.
142 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 120A (1965)).
143
Id. at 58; see also id.at 244-324.
140

141

"4

See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-4-407 (West 2012).
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state custody. The codified shopkeeper's privilege permits a limited detainment
for the explicit purpose of interrogation.14 5 Surveys suggest that internalized
private police detain suspects far more often than third-party private police;
47% of internalized officers reported using force to temporarily detain a
suspect, compared to only 12% of third-party forces.14 6 Thus, much like in the
context of arrest, internalized officers appear to exercise more discretion and
authority than third-party officers.
Second, private police interrogate proprietary employees of suspected
wrongdoing. Almost half of all internalized security guards engage in
investigative activities, "with employee theft the most frequently reported type
of investigation."l 4 7 Interrogations of proprietary employees, though, often
occur through consensual workplace questioning rather than forced
detainments. Of course, a proprietary employee hoping to keep her job in an
organization may have no option except to consent to interrogation.
Regardless of the context of the private police interrogation, any
incriminating information obtained by a private police officer is normally
admissible in future criminal prosecutions.14 8 Public police must read criminal
suspects Miranda warnings before commencing any custodial questioning
likely to elicit incriminating statements. 149 If a public police officer fails to read
Miranda warnings to a criminal suspect before an interrogation, any
incriminating statements made therein are inadmissible at trial.15 ) The judiciary
designed this regulation to protect a suspect's Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination in the face of psychologically coercive interrogation
techniques.'"' By contrast, the Miranda doctrine does not apply to private
police interrogations, as private police are not state actors.1 52 Statutory
authorization of private police detainments does not transform private police
into state actors covered by Miranda.'13 As a result, private police have
significant authority to interrogate suspect wrongdoers. Private police have
statutory authorization to detain and question suspected thieves, and private

14S

See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-30A-19.2 (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-116

(2012).
146

STROM ET AL., supra note

147

CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 50, at 34.

148

See infra Part 2.D.5.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966).

149

41, at 5-9 fig.23 (citing CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 36).

Iso

Id. at 479.
Id. at 467.
152
United States v. Antonelli, 434 F.2d 335, 337 (2d Cir. 1970) (holding that "the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination does not require the giving of constitutional
warnings by private citizens or security personnel employed thereby who take a suspect into custody"); In re Deborah C., 635 P.2d 446, 448-49 (Cal. 1981); People v. Ray, 65 N.Y.2d 282, 26869 (N.Y. 1985).
153
See, e.g,, State v. Bolan, 271 N.E.2d 839, 842 (Ohio 1971).
151
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police have coercive power to force employees to consent to interrogation.
Without the burden of Miranda warnings, private police can further control
questioning and transform interrogations into a mechanism of social control.
But institutional logics and purposes like justice or impartiality frame public
police interrogation methods, while private police interrogate for the purpose of
private property protection and capitalistic profit maximization.
4.

Community Surveillance

Much has been written on public law enforcement surveillance
capabilities.154 Public law enforcement increasingly utilizes technologies like
automatic license plate recognition ("ALPR"), surveillance cameras, and facial
recognition software as highly efficient tools of community surveillance. 155
These technological trends evidence a long-standing and expanding role of law
enforcement as community patrolmen. Private police, though, have just begun
taking on similar surveillance capabilities. For example, private lending
institutions increasingly surveil the community from private property near
public thoroughfares utilizing ALPR devices to create surveillance records to
assist in the collection of collateral from debtors.15 6 These companies then share
this surveillance data with private surveillance aggregators, like the National
Vehicle Location Service ("NVLS"), that combine the information into a
national database to assist private policing organizations locate debtors. 157
An example may illustrate this emerging and complex iteration of
private policing surveillance. A private person may take out a loan from a
private financial organization, using her automobile as collateral. If the private
person defaults on the terms of the loan, the financial organization may then be
legally entitled to take possession of the automobile. Unfortunately, it may be
nearly impossible for the financial organization to locate the automobile, as the
debtor might have left town in anticipation of the default. To address this very
type of problem, private police in financial organizations have installed
community surveillance technologies like ALPR to keep track of public
movements of persons and automobiles in their individual communities.158
Data aggregators like the NVLS then amass this type of micro-surveillance
from private police all around the country. 159 The result is a thorough, national
database of public movements. Because the courts afford individuals very

154 See, e.g., Stephen Rushin, The JudicialResponse to Mass Police Surveillance,2011 U. ILL.
J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 281 (2011).
'

Id at 285-89.

156

Id. at 293.

'
158

Id

15

Id.

Id.
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limited privacy in their movements in public, private police organizations can
aggregate this surveillance information without fear of legal consequences.o60
Indeed, the judicial and legislative branches have done virtually nothing to
regulate this type of broad community surveillance.161
Aggregative surveillance companies like the NVLS represent the
expansion of private policing into an arena previously occupied exclusively by
public police: widespread community surveillance. By working cooperatively,
private police have taken on functionally similar roles as community
patrolmen. But unlike public police, whose behaviors are framed and shaped by
institutions like democracy and logics like accountability, private police engage
in surveillance to further capitalistic motives of profit maximization.
5.

Misconduct, The State Action Doctrine, and Judicial Inaction

Generally, courts exclude evidence obtained by public police in
violation of the Fourth Amendment under the belief that evidentiary exclusion
is the only possible remedy to deter police misconduct.162 But despite the fact
that public and private police take on many of the same roles, the courts have
not excluded evidence unlawfully obtained by private police under the belief
that this evidence was obtained without the requisite state action. As Skalansky
has noted, "Perhaps the most basic and invariable principle of criminal
procedure is that constitutional restrictions on policing-the limitations of the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments [and] the prophylactic rules of
evidentiary exclusions ... apply only to investigative action attributable to the
government."163 At its core, the exclusionary rule is intended to be a protection
against public police misconduct.164 So as long as a private police officer acts
without the approval or assistance of a public police officer, courts have found
"no reason" for excluding evidence unlawfully obtained by virtually all forms
of private law enforcement.' 6 5 This is commonly called the state action
requirement for the exclusionary rule.

160

See generally id. (explaining that individuals typically have no reasonable expectation to
privacy in their public movements).
161
Id
162
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S 643, 669 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-92
(1914); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
163 Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1230-31.
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984) (noting that "the exclusionary rule is de'
signed to [specifically] deter police misconduct," not misconduct by other actors such as judges
or magistrates).
165
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 476 (1921); see also United States v. Shahid, 117
F.3d 322, 328 (7th Cir. 1997) (applying state action requirement to mall security guards); United
States v. Harless, 464 F.2d 953, 956-57 (9th Cir. 1972).
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This distinction was first recognized in Burdeau v. McDowell where
the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment protection against
unreasonable search and seizure only applies when the search is conducted by a
state official under the color of law.16 6 There, McDowell's employer suspected
him of "unlawful and fraudulent conduct," and the employer searched his
personal office without a warrant.167 McDowell claimed that the actions of his
employer qualified as an unreasonable search and seizure and thus violated the
Fourth Amendment.16 8 The Court quickly rejected McDowell's argument,
noting that the Fourth Amendment "was intended as a restraint upon the
activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon
other than government agencies." 69
Only in cases where the government endows private police with
governmental powers or functions will the courts utilize evidentiary exclusion
as a remedy for misconduct.170 But mere licensing of private police officers
does not normally qualify as an endowment of governmental power or
authority.171 In United States v. Lima, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals held that a District of Columbia ("D.C.") licensing regulation for
private security officers did not transform licensed private security officers into
state officials.172 The statute at issue in Lima codified the common law right of
private security officers to execute a citizen's arrest during their course of
employment. 73 But the court found this grant of power insufficient to
transform private police into public police for purposes of Fourth Amendment
exclusion. As the court noted, Congress almost certainly never intended the
statute to grant state authority to private security guards as evidenced by the
fact that the D.C. licensing requirement prohibited private security guards from
wearing uniforms or badges that resembled public police. 74 State licensing
requirements, or other statutory regulations, do not convert private police into
government agents.
The Lima decision can be contrasted with United States v. BecerraGarcia,'7 a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Burdeau, 256 U.S. at 475 (applying state action requirement to hotel security guards);
United States v. Francoeur, 547 F.2d 891, 894 (5th Cir. 1977) (applying state action requirement
to Disney World security guards).
166

167 Burdeau,256 U.S. at 473.
168 Id. at 470-71.
169
170
'7'

172
173

Id. at 475.
See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966).
United States v. Lima, 424 A.2d 113, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Id. at 119.
Id. at 120.

Id. at 11 9-20.
75United States v. Becerra-Garcia, 397 F.3d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir. 2005).

174
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Circuit. There, the Indian Civil Rights Act authorized private tribal rangers to
patrol a Native American reservation and report suspicious activity to the
United States Border Patrol or to local tribal police officers.17 6 The court
concluded that a tribal ranger who made investigatory stops under the Act to
enforce criminal trespass laws qualified as a state agent covered by the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule. 7 The test, according to the court, is whether
"the government knew of and acquiesced in the officer's activities, and the
party performed a seizure intended to assist law enforcement and did not act to
further his own ends."' 78 Indeed, when the government requests a private party
execute a search, this qualifies as governmental action regulated by the Fourth
Amendment. Courts have also found sufficient instigation in cases where police
hire a private engineer to install eavesdropping equipment.179 But the court has
been reluctant to view many private police officers as state agents without
explicit and undeniable coordination with government actors.
To summarize, the unlawful searches by private security officers do not
qualify as unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment; any evidence obtained
from these unlawful searches by private security officers is not subject to the
exclusionary rule and thus is admissible at trial. Virtually every state court has
simply adopted the national standard established in Burdeau. This has serious
implications for the efficacy of private police regulation. If, as I theorize,
institutional logics, like community accountability, influence private police less
than public police, we may expect private police to more frequently engage in
unlawful misconduct. The law, though, does not provide an adequate remedy
comparable to evidentiary exclusion to deter this bad behavior by private
police.
In sum, the law has facilitated the transformation of private police into
socially coercive actors comparable to public police. States have codified the
right of private police to arrest suspected wrongdoers. The law permits private
police to carry out quintessential law enforcement tasks like detainment,
investigations, interrogations, and surveillance. And the courts are unwilling to
exclude evidence obtained unlawfully through misconduct by private police. So
how does the law regulate private police? The next Part explores, categorizes,
and codes the current statutory regulation of private police.
III. STATE REGULATION OF PRIVATE POLICE
Most states have at least some law on the books mandating the
licensing of some private police personnel. Previous efforts to examine these
state-level regulations of private police have focused on the general substance
176

id

177

id.

178

id.
People v. Tarantino, 290 P.2d 505, 509 (Cal. 1955).

179
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of training requirements. In 1998, for instance, Jeff Maahs and Craig Hemmens
explored whether states require licensed security guards to meet age and
educational requirements, complete training courses, or pass criminal
background checks.180 Maahs and Hemmens noted that in 1998, approximately
82% of states regulate security guards in some manner.181 This was
significantly improvement over a 1982 study that found only 66% of states
mandated some regulation of private security guards.1 82 When read in tandem,
these types of studies paint a modestly optimistic view of emerging state-level
regulation of private security-although not perfect, states increasingly regulate
and license security guards.
Unfortunately, these studies ignore a pivotal fact: the vast majority of
state regulations explicitly distinguish between third-party private policing
agencies that contract with private companies, and internalized policing forces
that work within a single organization. While the majority of states regulate
third-party private police agencies, internalized officers are often exempt from
regulation under state statutes. In order to more precisely assess how the law
currently views private police, I collected and categorized state statutes
regulating security guards from all fifty states. Because state statutory
definitions of security guards represent over 95% of the entire private policing
industry, as defined in Part II.A., this provides a reasonably comprehensive
measure of the current regulatory status of private police as a whole. I coded
these statutes according to their applicability to both unarmed third-party
private police and unarmed internalized officers. I coded a statute as regulating
security guards if the statute requires licensing, registration, or training for
individual security guards or security guard employers.
Next, to understand the depth of security guard training requirements, I
also coded the state statutes according to several other features: (1) the number
of mandatory training hours, (2) whether the statute required liability insurance
or bonding, (3) whether the statute required a background check, (4) whether
the statute limited security guard's display of visual signs of authority, like
badges or insignia, and (5) whether the statute mandated firearms training for
armed guards. I only coded the states according to publically available statutory
and administrative code. Some statutes gave considerable regulatory discretion
to state-level administrative agencies. In these cases, I merely coded the
statutes and administrative codes according to my best interpretation of the
statute's plain language. While previous scholarship has coded statutory
regulation of private police, no recent scholarly study has comprehensively

Jeff Maahs & Craig Hemmens, Train in Vain: A Statutory Analysis of Security Guard
TrainingRequirements, 22 INT'L J. COMP. & APPLIED CRIM. JUST. 91 (1998).
181 Id. at 99.
180

182

C. Buikema & F. Horvath, Security Regulation: A State-by-State Update, 28 SEC. MGMT.

39 (1984).
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assessed the applicability of state statutes to both internalized and third-party
security guards.
A.

Differential Treatment of Internalizedand Third-PartyOfficers

While most states require some type of licensing, regulation or training
of third-party security guards or contractors, very few regulate internalized
security guards. Most states statutes explicitly exempt internalized private
security guards. 18 3 And nine states have no state-level statute regulating
security guards: Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, South Dakota, and Wyoming. Some of these states, like Colorado
and Missouri, nonetheless permit cities or counties to create their own
jurisdictional regulations. Figure 2 shows the breakdown of state statutes by the
type of private police regulated.
Figure 2: PercentageofStates Regulating Third-Partyand
InternalizedPrivatePolice Forces1 84

Third-Party
12

I litemaliz ed
and Tird-Party

o None

Two striking patterns emerge from the data. First, the total number of
states regulating private police in some manner has not changed since Maahs
and Hemmens 1998 study-thirteen years later, nine states still have no state
statutory regulation of private police. Second, states that regulate private police
consistently take steps to exclude internalized officers from their regulatory
purview. This important point has gone virtually unnoticed in contemporary
scholarship on private policing. Of the forty-one states that regulate security
guards in some manner, thirty-five of them, or about 85%, exempt internalized
officers from state licensing, registration, and training requirements. 85 As
discussed earlier, after decades of organizational externalization, third-party
private police today outnumber internally employed officers by about a three-

18
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 326.32 (West 2012) (stating that the term "security guard"
regulated in the statute does not include plain clothed proprietary security guards).
184 See appendix for a full list of statutes.
185

Id.
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to-two margin. This means that the law's differential regulation of third-party
and internalized officers likely has less significance today than it would have
four or five decades ago. Nonetheless, the law's differential treatment does
mean that a substantial cadre of private police engage in coercive behaviors that
mimic public law enforcement without any kind of state-mandated regulation.
In fact, by using this statutory coding scheme and the BLS data,186 I can
estimate that the state laws fail to regulate approximately 40,747 third-party
officers and 281,563 internalized officers-a total unregulated private police
force of 322,310 officers.187 That means there are more unregulated private
police in the United States than there are public police employees in California,
Texas and New York combined18 8 The remaining 684,570 security guards are
subject to at least some minimal state regulation. Nonetheless, this regulation,
as shown in Parts II.B and III, is far less than that required for public law
enforcement. Figure 3 visually aggregates the public and private police forces
in the United States and groups these forces according to the level of statemandated regulation. For the purposes of Figure 3, I classify the state
regulation of public law enforcement as "high regulation" and the state
regulation of private law enforcement as "low regulation."

OccupationalEmployment and Wages, May 2011, supra note 40.
calculated these estimates through reference to the BLS private police force estimates by
state. See id I presumed that in each state, approximately 60 percent of the private police officers
were third-party officers, with the remaining being internalized within organizations. After coding for whether the state regulated third-party or internalized officers, I added together the total
estimated number of officers unregulated by state licensing or training requirements. These calculations should not be taken as exact measurements but rather as educated estimates that allow
the reader to understand the magnitude of the unregulated private police force in the United
States. It is worth noting that the estimate total number of private police is higher in Figure 3 than
in 1. Figure 1 estimates the total number of private police by averaging the three different government estimates. Figure 3 only uses BLS data, since the BLS data includes convenient state-bystate breakdowns of private police officer populations.
186

187

188
Crime in the United States, Table 77, Full-Time Law Enforcement Employees, FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crimein-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10tbl77.xls (last visited Oct. 22, 2012).
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Figure 3: American Public andPrivatePolice ForceBreakdown by
Relative Level ofState Regulationl89

684.570
40.0%

OLow Regulation
aNo Regulation
a High Regulation

This finding is particularly perplexing because previous empirical work
has found that internalized private police engage in more coercive behavior
than third-party private police. Cunningham and colleagues conducted one of
the only qualitative interviews of both internalized and third-party private
police. Their findings revealed that internalized private police utilized force far
more often than third-party private police. I have reproduced the results of their
survey of 188 total private police officers below in Table 1.
Table 1: Comparative Use ofForce by Internalizedand
Third-PartyPrivatePolice Officers1 90
Force
in SelfDelf
Defense
Internalized
Officers
Third-Party
Officers

Evict

Deal with

Prevent

Execute

Detain

Arrest

Trespasser

Vandalism

Assault

Search

Suspect

Suspect

54%

39%

18%

39%

37%

47%

56%

13%

15%

10%

8%

6%

12%

4%

These findings have several important implications. To begin with, this

finding should lead us to reassess our cautious optimism about the coverage of
state private police regulations. Previous assessments of the state-level
regulation of private police were understandably optimistic-these analyses
189 FBI UCR, supra note 51; OccupationalEmployment and Wages, May 2011, supra note 40;
See also state statutes in Appendix.
190
Strom et al, supra note 41 at 5-9 (citing William Cunningham et al., Private security and
police in America: The Hallcrest Report 1 (1985)).
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failed to recognize the exception in most state statutes for internally employed
security officers. As a result, previous studies simply concluded that private
police roamed unregulated in only a handful of states-many of which were
sparsley populated. But many very populous states, like Texas' 9' and Florida,' 92
exempt internalized private police from regulation.
Additionally, this finding also raises a deeper, causal question. Why
have states consistently exempted internally employed private police officers
from state regulation? The available empirical evidence demonstrates that these
internalized officers are more likely to engage in coercive behaviors, execute
arrests, and detain or interrogate suspected wrongdoers during an
investigation.' As detailed in Part IV, I believe this regulatory trend reflects
the actual, underlying purpose of state-level private police regulations: the
facilitation of predictable business transactions between large organizations and
third-party security contractors.
B.

Depth of Training and Licensing Requirements

Almost all state statutes regulating private police mandate a criminal
background check for managers of third-party contractors or security personnel,
and virtually all of these states require liability insurance to protect purchasers
of security services from civil claims. A smaller proportion of states have
additional laws limiting visual signs of authority displayed by private police
and mandating firearms training for armed officers. Figure 4 illustrates the
proportion of states statutes claiming to regulate these various aspects of
private policing.
Figure 4: Depth of State Trainingand Licensing Requirements 94
80%

Background
Check

78%

Insuanceor VisalSignsof
Liability
Aithaity

Firearms
Training

Why are states more likely to mandate liability insurance than regulate
visual signs of authority? The number of states requiring liability insurance in

'9'

192
19
194

TEx. Occ. CODE ANN. § 1702.134 (West 2011); 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 493.6102 (West 2012).

§ 3.333 (2011).

STROM ET AL., supra note 41, at 5-9 fig.23 (citing CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 36).
See appendix for full list of state statutes.
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particular has skyrocketed over the last several decades. Thirty-five years ago,
only eleven states mandated some type of liability insurance.195 Today, thirtynine states require third-party contractors of security services to obtain liability
insurance to protect organizations purchasing their services, an increase of
254%.

States also increasingly require security guards to undergo several
of
training before licensing. Alaska,196 California,19 7 and Floridal 98 lead
hours
the pack by requiring private officers to undergo a full forty hours of training
before licensing. Many other states, including Georgia, 199 IllinoiS, 200
Oklahoma,20 1 and Texas,202 require between twenty and thirty hours of training.
The average state statute mandates a little over eight hours of training before
employment as a security guard or private police officer. This is a modest
improvement over earlier calculations.203 Organizations purchasing security
services can now be increasingly confident that third-party contractors employ
personnel with at least some training.
Nonetheless, the relatively minimal training requirements for private
police are particularly startling given the profound professionalization and
regulation of public police in the last several decades. The Supreme Court has
openly recognized that in recent years "[t]here have been 'wide ranging
reforms in the education, training, and supervision of police officers"' resulting
in "increase[ed] professionalism of police forces, including a new emphasis on
internal police discipline." 204 Departments are increasingly establishing civilian
review boards,20 5 and empirical studies demonstrate that the exclusionary
rule 2 0 6 has motivated law enforcement officers to learn the law and persuaded
departments to punish officers that violate a suspect's constitutional

195

CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 50, at 66.

196

ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 13,

§ 60.110

(2012).

9

CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7583.6 (West 2012).

198

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 493.6303 (West 2012).

199
200

GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 509-3-02 (2012).
225 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 447/25-20 (2012).

201

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 1750.3 (West 2012).
TEx. Occ. CODE ANN. § 1702.1675 (West 2012).

202

See Maahs & Hemmens, supra note 180.
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598-99 (2006) (quoting SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING
THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION INCRIMINAL JUSTICE, 1950-1990 51 (1993)).
205
See, e.g., Samuel Walker & Betsey Write, Civilian Review of the Police: A National Sur203

204

vey, (POLICE ExEcuTIvE RES. F.) (1994).
206
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S 643, 669 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 39192 (1914); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (all establishing that evidence obtained by a state actor through the violation of the constitution is inadmissible at trial).
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d
have also increasingly joined together in
protections. 207 Police departments
professional accreditation associations like the Commission on Accreditation
for Law Enforcement Associations ("CALEA") that inspect departments to
This network of
ensure compliance with accepted professional standards.
professional association and cooperative evaluation has resulted in the
isomorphic expansion of similar procedural protections and training
requirements in law enforcement departments across the country.209 But judges
and legal scholars alike have concluded that this rapid professionalization and
explosion of isomorphically diffused organizational policies may never have
happened without initial regulation.210 Private police are not comparably
regulated, based on my coding.
Overall, my coding demonstrates three distinct trends in state-level
statutes. First, most state statutes exempt internally employed private police
officers from training, registration, or licensing. Second, while statutes
generally require third-party security firms to check the criminal record of
employees and obtain liability insurance to protect their clients, these statutes
less frequently regulate visual signs of authority or firearm training. And third,
although more states require private police complete more training hours today
than in previous decades, officers are still chronically undertrained compared to
public police. Almost no state mandates accountability in the form of exclusion
of evidence obtained unlawfully by private police. States require private police
to complete few training hours before licensing, and private police appear
notably less professionalized than their public counterparts.

207 See, e.g., William C. Heffernan & Richard W. Lovely, Evaluating the Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule: The Problem ofPolice Compliance with the Law, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
311, 330-31 (1991); Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Comment, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence:
An EmpiricalStudy of ChicagoNarcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1016, 1017 (1987).
208

The Commission: About Us, COMMISSiON ON ACCREDITATION FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT

AGENCIES (CALEA), http://www.calea.org/content/commission, last accessed (last visited Oct.
17, 2012) (explaining the purpose and structure of CALEA).
209 Terry Gingerich & Gregory Russell, Accreditation and Community Policing: Are They
Neutral, Hostile, or Synergistic? An Empirical Test Among Street Cops and Management Cops, 2
JUST. POL'Y J. 3 (1996).
210

See generally SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION
IN

CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 1950-1990 (1993) (arguing that the Supreme Court's institutional of the exclusionary rule in Mapp v. Ohio stimulated improvements in police professionalization); Samuel
Walker, Thanks for Nothing, Nino, L.A. TIMES, June 25, 2006; cf Hudson v. Michigan 547 U.S.
568, 598-99 (Scalia arguing that police professionalization demonstrates that the exclusionary
rule is no longer necessary and thus may be obsolete in the near future).
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IV. TRENDS INPRIVATE POLICE REGULATION AND THE PATH MOVING
FORWARD

Empirical evidence demonstrates that private police, particularly
internalized officers, engage in many of the same behaviors of public law
enforcement. And these private officers are motivated by capitalist institutional
logics like profit maximization, increasing the theoretical likelihood of
misconduct. But state statutes consistently fail to regulate internalized officers.
I argue that when viewed in their totality, state statutes demonstrate a unifying
belief that licensing procedures ought to facilitate predictable transactions for
security services. This belief has pervaded the construction of private police
regulations resulting in regulations that inadequately consider important
regulatory values like accountability. I utilize Laura Dickerson's work,
Privatization and Accountability,211 in arguing that the law inadequately
provides for private police accountability in the form of redress for misconduct
and managerial oversight. Private police regulations must sufficiently provide
for organizational accountability comparable to public law enforcement.
A.

LicensingProceduresas Facilitationof OrganizationalTransactions

The statutory framework regulating private police consistently exempts
internalized private police officers from licensing and registration
requirements. Even states that do comprehensively regulate both third-party
and internalized officers, only outline minimal training requirements. One of
the most common licensing requirements, in fact, is that third-party security
contractors must obtain civil liability insurance to protect organizations
purchasing security services. No state mandates regularized or on-site
inspections of private police departments. I argue that, when viewed in their
totality, state-level regulations of private police merely facilitate predictable
transactions between third-party security contractors and large organizations.
This general statutory framework reflects a taken-for-granted belief
regarding the proper role of and threat posed by the government. Because
private police developed out of a pragmatic need to protect private property and
a belief that the private industry was better suited to fit this client-focused role,
the law views private policing as outside the purview of legitimate
governmental regulation. Private policing only needs to be regulated to the
extent that the regulation protects large organizations as buyers and consumers

of security services. This view is consistent with a western belief that the
government intervention into private business ought to be limited and that the
government itself is "the greatest threat to individual liberty." 212 This

211
212

See Dickerson, supra note 2, at 102.
Shearing & Stenning, supra note 56, at 497.
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conclusion is also consistent with the historical literature on organizational
regulation in the United States.2 13
According to sociologists Marc Schneiberg and Tim Bartley, twentieth
century scholarship identified three common theoretical explanations for
economic and social regulation of organizations. First, some scholars have
argued that business regulations emerged in response to demands from pluralist
interest groups.2 14 In many cases, scholars have noted instances where legal
regulation was forced on organizations over their opposition in order to appease
other interest groups. 215 A second potential reason for the emergence of
regulations is the need to foster capitalism and enterprise creation.216 For
instance, regulations can "fix [the] rules of competition"217 and ensure
commercially predictable transactions that encourage future dealing. Third,
regulation sometimes emerged after controversy or crises changes the
institutional environment.218 These crises resulted in increased public scrutiny,
manifested in the form of "investigations, hearings, court cases, and the
population press" and allow "outsiders and policy entrepreneurs to gain access
to policymaking, frame industry practices ... and put corporations on the
defensive." 2 19
The evolving regulations of private police appear to fall squarely into
the second category-that is to say that these regulations foster capitalism and
enterprise creation. Both private police interest groups and corporate interest
groups have historically pushed for the state, as opposed to local licensing of
third-party security guards. 22 0 This preference for state-level licensing
presumably reflects a desire on the part of security contractors for broadly
applicable and predictable state standards that moderate the market and avoid a
race-to-the-bottom. Once more, the proliferating requirement that third-party

Marc Schneiberg & Tim Bartley, Organizations,Regulation and Economic Behavior: Regulatory Dynamics and Formsfrom the Nineteenth to Twenty-First Century, 4 ANN. REV. L. &
213

Soc. Sci. 31, 33 (2008).
214

Id (citing

GERALD BERK, ALTERNATIVE TRACKS: THE CONSTRUCTION

OF AMERICAN

INDUSTRIAL ORDER, 1865-1917 (1994); FRANK DOBBIN, FORGING INDUSTRIAL POLICY: THE
UNITED STATES, BRITAIN, AND FRANCE IN THE RAILWAY AGE (1994); Mark T. Kanazawa & Roger
G. Noll, The Origins of State RailroadRegulation: The Illinois Constitution of 1870, in CLAUDIA

D. LIBECAP, THE REGULATED ECONOMY, 13-54 (1994)).
id
216
Id. at 34-35 (citing BERK, supra note 214; Frank Dobbin & Timothy J. Dowd, The Market
that Antitrust Built: Public Policy, Private Coercion, and RailroadAcquisitions, 1825 to 1922,
65 AM. Soc. REV. 631 (2000); COLLEEN A. DUNLAVY, POLITICS AND INDUSTRIALIZATION: EARLY
RAILROADS IN THE UNITED STATES AND PRUSSIA (1994)).
GOLDIN, GARGY
215

217
218

Id. at 34.

219

Id. at 35.
id

220

CUNNINGHAM ET AL.,

supra note 50, at 66.
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contractors carry liability insurance reflects a salient social concern for
protecting organizations from liability.
This statutory focus on capitalistic market facilitation, as opposed to
public rights protection, has important theoretical implications. The general
legislative distaste for extensive private police regulation suggests a growing
social tolerance for a dual justice system in the United States. This reiterates the
pluralistic nature of the law. As Shearing and Stenning have previously posited,
private policing is distinguishable from public policing in that private police
draw on corporate, not state power. 22 1 This does not mean that private police
are without power, though. Private police investigations can lead to the
termination of employees, restriction of access to private property, or the
selective use of state power to initiate lawsuits and press changes. 222 Private
police operate both as adjuncts to the public criminal justice system and as
powerful agents of a separate, corporate system of justice. Because private
police can control and deny access to "recreational and shopping facilitates,
housing, employment, and credit," private officers can indeed implement
sanctions for wrongdoing and exact a form of private justice somewhat
comparable to the public justice system.2 23 Legislatures across the country have
accepted and enabled this dualistic arrangement.
B.

The Path to FutureRegulation ofPrivatePolice

The risk of private police misconduct is theoretically and empirically
salient. Given the inadequacies of the current state-level statutory framework, I
make several normative recommendations for future private police policies.
Regulators must purposively design future private police policies to protect the
public from private police misconduct. In doing so, future regulations must
ensure that privatized police are accountable to the public. Regulations must
also be sensitive to the unique institutional logics motivating private police
behavior-namely capitalistic focus on profit maximization-in order to
adequately protect the public. Finally, regulations must be specific enough to
avoid organizational mediation. In order to accomplish these goals, I make
three normative recommendations for future private police policies.
First, future regulations must regulate both third-party and internalized
private police officers. The empirical evidence strongly suggests that
internalized officers are actually more likely to engage in socially coercive
behaviors than third-party officers.22 4 Internalized officers are more likely to
use physical force in self-defense, evict a trespasser, conduct a search, and
221
222
223

224

Shearing & Stenning, supra note 56, at 501.
Id. at 502.
id.
STROM ET AL., supra note 41, at 5-9 fig.23 (citing CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 36); see

also supra Part II.C.
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detain or arrest a suspect. 2 2 5 No doubt, the licensing of third-party contractors
serves an important purpose. These third-party licensing requirements ensure
that large organizations can hire necessary security services that will be
reasonably well trained and minimally insured. This facilitates business
transactions. But these regulations also serve a separate purpose, albeit
secondary purpose: the protection of the community. By mandating that most
third-party security guards undergo hours of training, a handful of educational
courses, and criminal background checks, most licensing requirements certainly
improve the interactions between third-party security guards and the general
public. But as it currently stands, the overwhelming majority of states do not
adequately train or educate internalized officers. These internalized officers
interact with employees and customers regularly, just like third-party officers.
By mandating criminal background checks, comparable training hours, and
educational courses, states can ensure that all private police personnel are
minimally competent to interact with the public.
Second, future regulations ought to avoid mere capitalistic goals of
market stabilization and instead should address broader concerns like unlawful
searches, arrests, surveillance, and interrogation. In doing so, regulations must
demonstrate a commitment to accountability through providing forums for
redress and managerial oversight. As traditional government functions like
prison operation and public safety have been outsourced to private companies,
scholars have worried that privatization weakens organizational and individual
accountability.22 6 Privatization of government functions has also raised
concerns that these private organizations may not properly supervise workers or
volunteers offering services.2 7 As Dickerson observes, the era of privatization
raises various distinguishable accountability concerns: after-the-fact
accountability for redress, managerial oversight, and democratic
accountability. 228 By after-the-fact accountability for redress, Dickerson means
that organizations must be subject to an authoritative penalty if the organization
fails "to comply with a particular rule or standard." 2 9 Conversely, managerial
oversight is a forward-looking regulation that involves constant monitoring and
re-evaluation. 23 0 Finally, democratic accountability refers to transparency
regulations that permit the polity to respond to governmental or privatized
actions.23 1 Current regulation and licensing requirements for private police are
devoid of all three of these accountability measures.

225

id

226

Dickerson, supra note 2, at 102-03.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 102-03, 109.
Id. at 103.

227
228

229
230

id.

231

Id. at 109-10.
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Currently, tort liability is the primary mechanism for after-the-fact
redress for private police misconduct.2 Tort law allows individuals to bring
civil claims against private police for unlawful arrest, imprisonment, assault, or
battery. This gives individuals limited avenues for redress as states have
increasingly added statutory sections that protect private police from
liability.2 Civil liability is also expensive. High entrance barriers functionally
limit the effectiveness of civil liability as a consistent tool for rights
rectification. Moreover, individuals with valid tort claims may rationally
choose not to bring claims against private police officers, as the damage caused
by the private police action may have been minimal, making substantial
recovery unlikely. And large organizations, be they third-party security
contractors or proprietary corporations, commonly employ private police. Thus,
there is a cogent argument to be made that these powerful, repeat players in the
legal system would find it advantageous to litigate and settle claims arising out
of aggressive private policing tactics so long as the perceived value added by
the aggressive policing outweighed the cost paid in litigation fees. 23 4
Thus, some scholars have argued that a more realistic method of
ensuring private police accountability through redress for misconduct would be
extending the exclusionary rule to include licensed, private police officers.235
Often, proponents of this course of action argue that, at minimum, courts ought
to extend the exclusionary rule to the private police when officers investigate or
prepare a criminal case for trial.236 But remember, private police appear to be
motivated by the institution of capitalism and logics like wealth accumulation.
Even if courts recognized private police as state actors, thereby mandating the
exclusion any unlawfully obtained by private police, would that necessarily
change private officers' behavior? Unfortunately, most private police may still
violate constitutional norms in obtaining evidence of criminal wrongdoing,
even if the courts were to extend the state action doctrine and exclusionary rule.
The exclusionary rule assumes that when a police officer's misconduct results
in the exclusion of evidence, supervisors within that department will implement
training and policies that prevent misconduct in the future. This conclusion
assumes that police are democratically accountable and motivated by a desire
to successfully prosecute wrongdoers. But as I discussed in Part II.C., the
institution of capitalism and the logics of wealth accumulation, profit
maximization, and client service drive private police action. Scholars have also
Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1183 (noting that the "main legal limits on the private police are
tort," and the criminal law).
233
INBAU, FARBER & ARNOLD, supra note 116, at 173-74; see also supra Part II.C.
234
See generally Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits ofLegal Change, 9 LAw & Soc'Y 95, 101 (1974).
235
See, e.g., Enion, supra note 33, at 519.
236 See, e.g., Steven Euller, PrivateSecurity and the Exclusionary Rule, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 649, 651 (1980).
232
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documented that private police already regularly engage in a sort of private
criminal justice-punishing perceived wrongdoers outside of the traditional
criminal justice system.237 While extending the exclusionary rule to private
police may deter some misconduct, it will not necessarily serve as a consistent
and effective deterrent. Private police will continue to violate constitutional
norms on searches, seizures, interrogations, and arrests so long as such actions
will protect assets without exposing their private employers to significant civil
liability. For most private police, the successful prosecution of a wrongdoer is
probably of low priority.
But there are other ways that regulators can legislatively ensure private
police accountability and redress for misconduct. To more thoroughly deter
private police wrongdoing, states could provide citizens with a specific right of
action against private police for wrongful use of force. States could permit
aggrieved citizens to exercise this right of action in a cheap forum for redress,
such as an administrative hearing. An administrative hearing option would be
preferable to simple judicial remedy as it costs citizens substantially less to
mobilize their legal claims against private police officers. States could also
mandate minimum, punitive damages for constitutional violations by private
police.
State legislatures would likely need to provide any private police
accountability in the form of managerial oversight and democratic
accountability. States could mandate that private police organizations keep
thorough records of arrests, searches, and interrogations. These sorts of
reporting requirements would also serve democratic accountability purposes by
establishing a government record of coercive actions taken by private police. In
order to enhance managerial oversight, states could also mandate continued inservice training for high-ranking officials within private policing organizations.
Conversely, states could require independent regulatory agencies to regularly
visit private police organizations and monitor internal policies. Extensive,
hands-on managerial oversight of private police is problematic, though,
because private police are characteristic front-line bureaucrats who necessarily
238
wield significant discretion.
Third, policymakers must regulate private police in a manner that is
specific and precise as to avoid organizational mediation. When regulations are
vague or ambiguous, organizations commonly mediate the implementation and
impact of the law. Lauren Edelman has shown how equal employment and
See generally Simmons, supra note 32, at 911 (noting that "[p]rivate criminal law, for example, has grown into an immense industry operating completely outside of the public criminal
justice system").
238
See generally LIPSKY, supra note 92 (describing how police and other public service workers with extensive contact with the public wield considerable discretion, thereby acting as front237

line policymakers); MUSHENO & MAYNARD-MOODY,

supra note 92 (detailing how police and

other social service officers ascribe identities to members of the public and use these identities to
justify their actions).
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affirmative action laws typically establish broad regulatory goals without
offering explicit procedural rules. 23 9 As a result, these broad regulatory
mandates leave ample room for organizations to construct the meaning of legal
compliance and "thus mediate the impact of law on society." 24 0 Therefore, any
regulation of private police must be precise enough to avoid organizational
mediation. In doing so, regulations ought to consider the differential logics
motivating the behavior of public and private police. We should expect private
security to mediate any regulation in a manner that maximizes profit. This
concern seems particularly significant in the context of state regulations of
visual signs of authority. Many states bar private police from wearing a badge
or insignia that is deceptively similar to public law enforcement. 24 1 While some
states mandate regulatory agencies approve all visual signs of authority, others
merely posit that signs of authority must be distinguishable.24 2 Such ambiguity
opens the door for organizational mediation and construction of the law.
V. CONCLUSION

The pluralization of American policing has resulted in a formidable,
alternative force of law enforcers wielding enormous discretion and routinely
engaging in socially coercive behavior. These private police officers represent a
necessary, but potentially dangerous, form of social control. State regulations
of private police have addressed one potential concern related to private
policing by ensuring predictable transactions between large organizations and
third-party security contractors. No doubt, this type of regulation is important
and necessary. But the law continues to draw a deceptive dichotomy between
private and public police based solely upon the fact that public police exercise
the "official" authority of the state. State laws inadequately regulate private
police-particularly internalized officers who are largely unburdened by any
legal requirements. This has to change. And any future regulation of private
policing must carefully consider the unique institutional logics motivating
private policing organizations. An understanding of organizational theory can
improve future private police regulation and facilitate a thoughtful shift in the
law's treatment of private policing.

Lauren Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: OrganizationalMediation of
Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. Soc. 1531, 1533 (1992).
239
240

Id. at 1532.
241 See supraPart III.B.
242 See supra Part III.B.
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APPENDIX

Regulates
Third-Party
Security

Regulates
Internalized
Security

Guards?

Guards?

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

California

See CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE §§ 7580-7588.5
(West 1994).

Yes

Yes

Colorado

No Regulations

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

Code Section

States

Alabama

See ALA. CODE § 34
27C-4 (2009).

Alaska

See ALASKA STAT. ANN.
§ 18.65.400-18.65.490
(1976); ALASKA ADMIN.
CODE tit. 13, §§ 60.00060.900 (2012).

Arizona
Arkansas

Connecticut

Delaware

See ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 32-2601- 322642 (2002).
See ARK. ADMIN. CODE
055.00.1-3 (2012).

See CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 29-161g-161aa
(West 2011).
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
24, §§ 1301-1341 (West
1974).

Florida

See FLA. STAT. ANN. H
493.6100-493.6406
(2001).

Georgia

Hawaii

See GA. CODE ANN., §§
43-38-1-43-38-17 (Lexis
2005).
See HAW. REv. STAT. H
463-1-463-17 (West
2010).

Idaho
Illinois

No Regulations
See 225 ILL. COMP. STAT.
§§ 447/25-5-447/25-30
(2007).
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Regulates
Third-Party
Security
Guards?

Regulates
Internalized
Security
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No

No
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No
No

Yes

No

Yes

No

BUS. OCC. & PROF. §§

Yes

No

19-401-411 (West 1996).
See MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 147, §§ 22 -26

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

No
No

No
No

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Code Section

States

See IND. CODE ANN. §§

Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine

25-30-1.3-1-25-30-1.3-24
(West 2007).
See IOWA CODE ANN. §§
80A.1-80A.18 (West
1998).
No Regulations
No Regulations
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 37:3270-37:3298
(2007).
See ME. REV. STAT. tit.

32, §§ 9401-9418 (1981).
See MD. CODE ANN.,

Maryland
Massachusetts

(1981).
Michigan

See MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 338.1051338.1092

Minnesota

(West

2001).

See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§
326.32-326.3386 (West
2004).

Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada

No Regulations
No Regulations
See MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 37-60-101 to -411
(2011).
No Regulations
See NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 648.005-210
(West 2011).
See N.H. REV. STAT.

New Hampshire ANN. §§ 106-F:1 to :16
(2012).
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Regulates
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No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

See OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 181.870-.889 (West
2005); OR. ADMIN. R.
259-060-0005 to -6000
(2012).

Yes

Yes

Pennsylvania

See 22 PA. CONS. STAT.
§§ 11-30 (2012).

Yes

No

Rhode Island

See R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 5

Yes

No

See S.C. CODE ANN. §§

Yes

Yes

No Regulations

No

No

New Jersey

New Mexico

New York

North Carolina

North Dakota

Ohio

Oklahoma

45:19A-1 to -12 (West
2012); N.J. ADMIN. CODE
13:55A-4.1 (West 2012).
See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§
61-27B-1 to -26 (West
2012).
See N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW
§§ 89-E to -w (McKinney
2012).
See N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 74C-1 to -24
(West 2011).
See N.D. CENT. CODE §§
43-30-01 to -40-16
(2005); N.D. ADMIN.
CODE 93-02-01.1-01 to 03-06 (2011).
See OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 4749.01-.99
(West 2012).
See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
59, §§ 1750.1-.24 (West
2012).

Oregon

South Carolina
South Dakota

5.1-1 to -24 (2012).

40-18-20 to -50 (2012).
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Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No
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See Wis. STAT. ANN. §

Yes

No

No Regulations

No

No

See TENN. CODE ANN. §§
62-35-101 to -142 (West
2012).
See TEX. OCC. CODE
ANN. §§ 1702.101-.134
(West 20011); 34 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 3.333
(2011).
See UTAH CODE ANN. §§
58-63-301 to -310 (West
2008); UTAH ADMIN.
CODE r. R156-63a
(2012).

See VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
Vermnont

Virginia

Washington

West Virginia

26, §§ 3171-3180 (2010);
20-4 VT. CODE R. § 1500
(2012).
See VA. CODE ANN. §§
9.1-138 to -150 (West
2012).
See WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 18.170.010-.902
(West 2004); WASH.
ADMIN. CODE 308-18030 to -320 (2011).
See W. VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 30-18-1 to -13 (West
2012).

Wisconsin

440.26 (West 2012).

Wyoming
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